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Abstract
The best and most popular argument for probabilism is the accuracy-dominance
argument, which purports to show that alethic considerations alone support
the view that an agent’s degrees of belief should always obey the axioms of
probability. I argue that extant versions of the accuracy-dominance argument
face a problem. In order for the mathematics of the argument to function as
advertised, we must assume that every omniscient credence function is clas-
sically consistent; there can be no worlds in the set of dominance-relevant
worlds that obey some other logic. This restriction cannot be motivated on
alethic grounds unless we’re also willing to accept that rationality requires be-
lief in every metaphysical necessity, as the distinction between a priori logical
necessities and a posteriori metaphysical ones is not an alethic distinction. To
justify the restriction to classically consistent worlds, non-alethic motivation is
required. And thus, if there is a version of the accuracy-dominance argument in
support of probabilism, it isn’t one that is grounded in alethic considerations
alone.
0 Introduction
The best and most popular argument for probabilism is the accuracy-dominance ar-
gument, which purports to show that alethic considerations—that is, considerations
relating to modalities of truth—alone support the view that an agent’s degrees of
belief should always obey the axioms of probability.In slightly more detail: if we as-
sume that rationality requires us to be as close to omniscience as possible, then no
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matter what informational state we’re in, the best credence function or functions
will be probability functions. In this paper, I argue that the argument requires sup-
plementation: alethic considerations alone are insufficient to motivate the standard
version of probabilism.
The problem is as follows. In order for the mathematics of the accuracy-dominance
argument to function as advertised, we must assume that every omniscient credence
function is classically consistent; there can be no worlds in the set of “dominance-
relevant worlds” (Pettigrew 2021) that obey some other logic. This restriction cannot
be motivated on alethic grounds unless we’re also willing to accept that rationality
requires belief in every metaphysical necessity, as the distinction between a priori
logical necessities and a posteriori metaphysical ones is not an alethic distinction.
To justify the restriction to classically consistent worlds, non-alethic motivation is
required. And thus, if there is a successful version of the accuracy-dominance argu-
ment in support of probabilism, it isn’t one that is grounded in alethic considerations
alone.
To be clear, my intent here is not to show that probabilism is false, or even to show
that the accuracy-based argument for it fails. Instead, my aim is to attack a particular
interpretation of what it is that the accuracy-dominance argument shows. On the
interpretation in question, the only (fundamental) epistemic value employed in the
argument is the alethic value of accuracy to the truth.1 Since probabilistic credence
functions are closer to the truth “no matter what,” any non-probablistic credence
function is irrational in virtue of conflicting with this fundamental alethic value.
My contention is that to be successful, the accuracy-dominance argument requires
(implicit or explicit) appeal to additional, non-alethic, considerations—particularly
considerations of justification or evidence—because the desire for accuracy alone is
insufficient to motivate a distinction between logical and metaphysical necessities,
and the argument needs this distinction to succeed.
The layout of the paper is simple. Section 1 sketches the accuracy-dominance
argument for probabilism. Section 2 shows that the argument relies on restricting
the set of possibilities to those that are classically consistent. Section 3 argues that
alethic considerations are insufficient to justify the restriction. Section 4 show how
introducing evidential considerations in addition to alethic ones can resolve the prob-
lem. Section 5 discusses the consequences of this move.
One final note. As already indicated, by “alethic” considerations I mean consid-
erations relating to metaphysical modalities; by “evidential” considerations I mean
1So far as I can tell, this is the interpretation offered by both Joyce (1998) and Pettigrew (2016).
The former, for instance, says describes the argument as showing that probabilism “contributes to
the basic epistemic goal” of “accurately represent[ing] the world” (Joyce 1998, 576).
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considerations relating to how evidence constrains (rational) belief. As one reviewer
rightly stressed, however, these aren’t the only ways to use these notions. For in-
stance, the modal distinction between epistemic mights and musts is at least arguably
alethic. As we’ll see in the final section, if the defender of the accuracy-dominance
argument wants to appeal to alethic considerations in this (broader) sense, I have
no objections—but I’ll argue that doing so requires rethinking what it is that the
argument shows.
1 The accuracy-dominance argument for proba-
bilism
In its simplest form, which is all we need here, the accuracy-dominance argument for
probabilism proceeds as follows:
(DA) Dominance avoidance
An agent is rational only if they are not accuracy dominated.2
(CD) Credal dominance
An agent’s degrees of belief obey the axioms of probability if and
only if they are not accuracy dominated.
∴ (PR) Probabilism
An agent is rational only if their degrees of belief obey the axioms
of probability.3
My concerns with this argument are best understood as concerns with the first
premise. To see why I take the first premise to be problematic, however, we’ll need to
understand what motivates the second premise, namely (CD). In this section, I sketch
a largely intuitive outline of the proof of what I’m calling credal dominance (those
2As Carr (2017, 2021) stresses, it may be better to think of the accuracy-dominance argument
as applying to the rationality of credences or credal states rather than agents. I’m foregoing such
complications here for ease of presentation.
3For the purposes of the first four sections of this essay, I’ll limit “probabilism” to this claim,
though there are other theses that go by the same name. For instance: Pettigrew (2021) defends
what he calls “personal probabilism,” according to which rationality demands a different form of
coherence determined by what possibilities are open to an agent. My arguments here should not
be taken to undermine that view or others like it; I’m concerned only with versions of probabilism
that require logical omniscience.
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interested in the technical details should see Joyce 1998, 2009; Pettigrew 2015, 2016).
My objection is raised in the next section. Anyone familiar with the technical details
can safely skip the rest of this section—though my terminology differs at times from
that of both Joyce and Pettigrew, I’m relatively confident that any serious differences
will be clear in context.
Begin with a set of propositions F , which are assumed to form a Boolean algebra;
they’re closed under negation and countable disjunction. A credence function on F
is a function c: F → [0, 1]. A probability function on F is a credence function that
is normalized (c(⊥) = 0 and c(>) = 1) and (countably) additive (for any partition
X, c(X) =
∑
X∈X c(X)). The set of probability functions we’ll represent with PF . To





where the lower the score is the better. To measure accuracy in particular, we’ll use
the distance from the omniscient credence function at a world w, which we’ll call ow.
The crucial property that we need can be defined as follows:
Accuracy dominated
A credence function c is accuracy dominated if and only if there is a
credence function c∗ such that c∗ is closer to every omniscient credence
function than c.
This definition can be stated more formally as
AD(c) := ∃c∗3 ∀w ∈ WF ,B(ow, c∗) < B(ow, c)
Here WF is the set of possible worlds, where these are understood as the set of
maximally consistent propositions in F . As indicated above, what we want to prove
is that a credence function is accuracy dominated if and only if it is not a probability
function: c 6∈ PF ⇔ AD(c).
The proof has essentially two main steps. The first move, and the key one from
our perspective, is to show that the set of probability functions on F is the “convex
hull” of the set of omniscient credence functions. That is, it’s equivalent to the set
of weighted sums of such functions:
PF = O+F = {
∑
w∈WF










Figure 1: The simplest case. The dotted line is the convex hull between the two
omniscient credence functions oA (the world where A is true) and oĀ (the world
where it is false). Note that c∗ is closer to any point on the line than c is. Inspired
by Pettigrew (2016).
In something closer to English, what this means is that PF picks out what we can
think of as the most minimal “path” between the omniscient functions. When there
are only two worlds, this set will pick out a straight line segment between them; with
three worlds, we get the interior of a triangle, etc. Note the important point for our
purposes that the set of weighted sums (O+F ) is essentially every omniscient credence
function plus the various acceptable functions that mix various of these omniscient
credence functions together. So change the omniscient credence functions and you
change O+F . We’ll return to this point below.
The second step is to show that for any non-probabilistic credence function c,
there is some probability function c∗ such that for all p ∈ PF , B(c, c∗) ≤ B(c, p).
That is, there’s a probability function c∗ that is the closest probability function to c.
This probability function, in turn, is closer to every other probability function than
c is, or, for all p, B(p, c∗) < B(p, c). Life is easier in the simple cases (and easier
still in picture, see figure 1), so think of a line segment connecting two omniscient
credence functions, oA and oĀ, (call this line “AĀ”) and a point not on the line c.
Draw a second line through c perpendicular to AĀ. The intersection of the new line
with AĀ (call this point “c∗”) is both the closest point on AĀ to c and closer to any
other point on AĀ than c is. The present idea is simply a generalization, and works
because we’ve already proven that the set of probabilities is like a line in the sense
that it’s the most minimal “path” between the omniscient functions.
Together, these two steps show is that for any non-probabilistic credence function
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c, there is a probability function c∗ that is closer to any probability function than c
is. Since the omniscient credence functions are themselves probability functions, c∗ is
closer to any omniscient credence function than c is. Or: c 6∈ PF ⇒ AD(c). Precisely
the same results indicate that the other direction holds as well, completing the proof.
The argument from credal dominance and dominance avoidance to probabilism is
usually (and I think rightly) taken to be the best argument for probabilism. As Petti-
grew (2016) shows, it relies on few substantive assumptions other than that degrees
of beliefs are to be judged on the basis of their accuracy. Nevertheless, beginning
in the next section, I’ll argue that it fails because it relies on an assumption whose
implications have been underappreciated.
2 Accuracy-dominance and logical impossibilities
In this section, I show that the accuracy-dominance argument relies on the unstated
assumption that the class of worlds that accuracy is measured against does not
include any worlds that are inconsistent by the lights of classical logic—that is, as
I’ll usually put it, the class of worlds that accuracy is measured against is “restricted”
to the classically consistent worlds.
Though the standard presentations of the accuracy dominance argument do not
usually make this assumption explicit, they do implicitly assume that there are no
worlds at which contradictions are true—there are no logically impossible worlds.4
This assumption is extremely important. Probability functions are by definition nor-
malized, meaning that they assign 0 probability to contradictions. The accuracy-
dominance argument relies on the fact that every omniscient credence function is
a probability function and thus that every omniscient credence function assigns 0
probability to contradictions. Hence it requires that there are no worlds that violate
the laws of classical logic.
We can illustrate this point by considering what happens when we introduce a
world in which some contradiction is true (though exactly the same reasoning holds
in the case where a tautology is false). So, suppose that there is at least one world
w such that A ∧ ¬A is true at this world. Then there is an omniscient credence
function ow such that ow(A∧¬A) = 1. Then this omniscient credence function is not
normalized and thus not a probability function. Then the set of probability functions
4What’s explicitly assumed is a stronger condition, namely that the set of propositions form
a Boolean algebra (Joyce 1998, 2009; Pettigrew 2015) or a subalgebra of such (Pettigrew 2016).
Either assumption rules out logically impossible worlds and (thus) ensures that every omniscient
credence function is a probability function. Note that Pettigrew (2021) drops this assumption, and








Figure 2: The simplest cases of accuracy dominance failure that are possible when
logically impossible worlds are admitted into WF . The dotted line still represents
the set of probability functions, but is no longer the convex hull of the omniscient
credence functions, which is now represented by the shaded area.
is not equivalent to the set of weighted sums of the omniscient credence functions.
In the intuitive characterization given above, the effect is that the set of probability
functions no longer picks out the most minimal “path” between omniscient credence
functions (it’s not equivalent to the convex hull of such functions), and thus the
geometric argument of second step of the proof fails. (In pictoral form, see figure 2.)
The above considerations show that the accuracy-dominance argument for prob-
abilism relies on the assumption that the set of worlds includes only classically con-
sistent worlds. This isn’t a new observation: as Williams (2012) proves, altering the
logic of the worlds that accuracy is measured against alters which credence functions
are picked out by the argument. If said logic is intuitionistic, then every rational
credence function assigns φ to 1 iff φ can be proven constructively, and if φ is a
constructive consequence of ψ, then there’s a familiar “no drop” principle that holds
between them: an agent’s credence in φ should be at least as high as their credence
in ψ (for details of the intuitionistic case in particular, see Weatherson 2003). Which
worlds are taken to be “dominance-relevant” (Pettigrew 2021) has a substantive ef-
fect on which credence functions are rational; it’s only when the set of worlds is
restricted to the classically consistent worlds that the rational credence functions are
guaranteed to obey the axioms of probability. Without some motivation for restrict-
ing the dominance-relevant worlds to the classically consistent worlds, therefore, the
argument does not offer any support to probabilism as traditionally understood.5
5Of course, we might simply be interested in the question of what kind of credence functions
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If the accuracy-dominance argument for probabilism is to succeed, we’ll need some
motivation for accepting the restriction to classically consistent worlds.
The upshot is that the two premises of the accuracy-dominance argument are
better represented as follows (alterations in italics):
(DA∗) Dominance avoidance∗
An agent is rational only if they are not accuracy dominated relative
to the classically consistent worlds.
(CD∗) Credal dominance∗
An agent’s degrees of belief obey the axioms of probability if and
only if they are not accuracy dominated relative to the classically
consistent worlds.
The change from (CD) to (CD∗) captures the technical point just made; the change
from (DA) to (DA∗) is necessary to preserve validity. The challenge facing the propo-
nent of the accuracy-dominance argument is then to offer a motivation for accepting
(DA∗)—and particularly, a motivation for the restriction that distinguishes (DA∗)
from (DA).
3 In insufficiency of alethic considerations
In the last section, I showed that the accuracy-dominance argument for probabilism
requires a commitment to (DA∗): if the argument is to succeed, we need some reason
to restrict the set of worlds that accuracy is measured against to the classically consis-
tent worlds. In this section, I’ll argue that alethic considerations alone are insufficient
to motivate this restriction. As such, if there are reasons to accept (DA∗) and thus
the accuracy-dominance argument for probabilism, they must be based in sources of
epistemic normativity other than the aim of having true beliefs. The basic reason
is simple: alethic considerations—where, recall, this means considerations relating
to truth modalities—alone make no distinction between a posteriori necessities and
a priori ones; from the perspective of accuracy (to the truth), there’s no difference
are rational given the assumption that the relevant set of worlds is the set of classically consistent
worlds. I take it that this isn’t what at least some proponents of the accuracy-dominance argument
want out of it—the argument is supposed to provide a reason why obedience to the axioms of
probability is mandated by rationality, not just an indication of what credence functions are most
accurate given the assumptions.
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between true beliefs about logical consequences and true beliefs about metaphysics.6
No matter how we try and precisify the various notions, therefore, any appeal to
alethic reasons to eliminate classically impossible worlds from consideration will also
motivate eliminating metaphysically impossible worlds. The result is that without
further modification the accuracy-dominance argument shows that full confidence in
every metaphysical necessity is a requirement of rationality—a result that I, at least,
take to be unacceptable.
To illustrate the point, consider how one might argue for (DA∗) on alethic grounds.
If we assume that classical logic is the “one true logic” then the worlds in which clas-
sical logic is violated are not in fact possible worlds. Since there’s no sense in which
classically inconsistent worlds are possible candidates for the truth, they shouldn’t
be counted among the dominance-relevant worlds; there’s no situation in which these
impossible worlds are the ones against which one’s beliefs are ultimately judged. In
other words, the “restriction” to classically consistent worlds is in some sense no
restriction at all: we’re simply measuring accuracy against all the worlds that there
are. There’s no broader class of worlds that it would make sense to measure accuracy
against.
The argument just sketched relies on strong assumptions about the nature of logic
and rationality—we must assume both that classical logic is the one true logic and
that rationality is “external and evaluative” (Williams 2018)—but it does meet the
constraint that the only motivation for the restriction to classically consistent worlds
is a concern with truth; there’s no appeal in this argument to concerns about evidence
or justification.Nevertheless, the argument just given has a problem: it shows too
much. Consider the implications of the above reasoning for an arbitrary a posteriori
necessary truth φ. By the same argument given above, φ is true at every actually
existing world and thus at every world that accuracy is measured against. Since φ is
true at every dominance-relevant world, every omniscient credence function assigns
a credence of 1 to φ. As a consequence, every member of the convex hull (that is, the
set of weighted sums) of the omniscient credence functions also assigns a credence of
1 to φ. Then, for any credence function c that assigns a credence of less than 1 to φ,
there is another credence function c∗ that assigns a credence of 1 to φ and dominates
c—for exactly the same reasoning as was given in the first section. The result is that
assigning a credence of 1 to φ is a requirement of rationality, and I take it that this
result is undesirable: it implies that an agent is only rational if they believe every a
posteriori necessary truth.
As indicated, I intend this example to be illustrative; I don’t take it that the only
possible way of justifying the restriction to classically consistent worlds on alethic
6Note that Pettigrew (2021, 9994) seems to anticipate this point.
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grounds is precisely the argument given above. Nevertheless, this argument reveals
an important and general point, namely that alethic concerns don’t provide us with
the resources to distinguish between a priori necessary truths—truths that are (pre-
sumably) not open to empirical evidence—and a posteriori ones that are almost by
definition not propositions that agents must believe on pain of irrationality. There
cannot be any alethic motivation for eliminating some impossibilities from considera-
tion that doesn’t tell equally in favor of eliminating all of them. The reason is simple:
the distinction between an a priori necessity and a posteriori one is fundamentally
an evidential distinction rather than an alethic one: both kinds of proposition are
necessary; but on any view that draws this distinction, one is open to empirical evi-
dence in a way that the other is not (compare Williams 2018, 138).7 The upshot is
that there are no alethic grounds for the restriction found in (DA∗): from a purely
alethic perspective, metaphysical and logical impossibilities stand and fall together.
Either both are relevant when measuring accuracy or neither is.
I think that the first of these two options is the preferable one: we should recog-
nize that alethic considerations alone are insufficient to motivate interesting episte-
mological theses—or, even more minimally, that we cannot go directly from alethic
considerations to an account of rationality without at least making a stop at the
nature of evidence and justification. What we should believe is as much a matter of
respecting the available evidence as it is a matter of accuracy to the truth. I’ll say a
bit more about this in the next section, and show how the defender of probabilism can
save the accuracy-dominance argument by appealing to evidential considerations.
First, though, it’s worth briefly discussing the other option, namely eliminating
both metaphysical and logical impossibilities from the class of worlds against which
accuracy is judged. As we’ve seen, the result of this restriction is that both logical and
metaphysical ominscience are required by rationality. Perhaps this result does not
seem like too much of a cost. After all, if we’re defending probabilism, we’ve already
accepted that rationality requires us to believe tautologies that are far beyond our
ability to comprehend let alone prove; accepting the further claim that rationality
requires us to believe all metaphysical necessities may seem like a relatively minimal
step. It should not, however. The costs of accepting the conclusion that rationality
requires full belief in all metaphysical necessities are significant and far-reaching.
Consider what we might call the enkratic constraint : it is never permissible to believe
that A is true while simultaneously believing that the evidence fails to support A—
7One way out of the argument just given is to reject this distinction entirely and collapse meta-
physical necessity to logical necessity (perhaps plus various linguistic commitments). This seems
to me like a worrying amount of metaphysics to be committed to in pursuing an epistemological
thesis, but it is a potential rejoinder.
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that is, it’s never rational to be in a state of epistemic akrasia. Though there are
some debates about this principle to be found in the literature, it’s widely accepted
and often taken to be a relatively fundamental or secure principle of rationality.8
Biting the bullet and accepting that rationality requires belief in all metaphysical
necessities would require rejecting the enkratic constraint. Supposing uncontrover-
sially that agents can lack evidence for some a posteriori metaphysical necessity,
rationality will require them to nevertheless believe both that said metaphysical ne-
cessity is true and that the evidence fails to support it. Notice, importantly, that this
failure of the enkratic constraint is an extremely serious one: on the view outlined,
it’s not just that epistemic akrasia is permissible; it’s required. Further, the case in
question is not one in which violations of the enkratic constraint are usually thought
to arise. On the contrary, the view that full belief in metaphysical necessities is a
requirement of rationality will also determine that epistemic akrasia is rationally re-
quired in all cases in which an agent believes that they fail to have definitive evidence
for a metaphysically necessary proposition. We could keep on biting bullets here. But
accepting that rationality requires belief in all metaphysical necessities—including
in particular a posteriori necessities like “all whales are mammals”—would require
a substantial rethinking of epistemology, and one that it’s hard to see independent
motivation for.
4 Abandoning the alethic
In the prior sections, I’ve argued that the accuracy-dominance argument for proba-
bilism faces a problem: alethic considerations alone are insufficient to motivate the
required restriction to classically consistent worlds. In this section, I’ll turn towards a
positive suggestion. Since the problem faced by the accuracy-dominance argument is
that alethic considerations are insufficient to motivate a distinction between logical
and metaphysical necessity—a distinction that the defender of the argument needs
if they are to avoid holding that rationality requires full belief in all metaphysical
necessities—the obvious solution is to appeal to non-alethic considerations. I’ll illus-
trate the point with what seem to me to be the only plausible grounds for upholding
the distinction, namely justificatory or (as I’ll take to be equivalent, but will prefer
because it’s slightly less awkward) evidential considerations.
8For a survey of the literature, see Lasonen-Aarnio (2020, 600–1, note 7); for philosophers
taking some form of the enkratic constraint to be fundamental or secure see, e.g., Horowitz (2014)
and Titelbaum (2015, 2019). Note, however, that the considerations that motivate the enkratic
constraint are not accuracy-based: it is strictly speaking open to the defender of the argument to
deny it.
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Here’s how this appeal might go. First, we give some story about what is required
of agents when they learn evidence E. Importantly, at this juncture the story must
be non-probabilistic if we want to avoid circularity—effectively, we’re only consider-
ing what worlds E makes (im)possible for the agent, not what the agent ought do
in relation to all the remaining worlds. Suppose, for instance, that for the reasons
outlined by defenders of logical omniscience such as Smithies (2015), we accept that
the “logic of evidence” is essentially classical: E constrains what’s rational by elim-
inating from consideration any world that is classically incompatible with it. More
precisely, we think that the right story to tell about what evidence requires is one
that validates the following principle:
(IE) (Classical) inconsistency elimination
Learning E rules out as rationally impermissible all and only worlds
classically inconsistent with E.
This principle can then be used to restrict the class of dominance-relevant worlds.
Since all classical inconsistencies entail (classically, of course) a contradiction in con-
junction with the empty set, this principle entails that even an agent with no evidence
whatsoever must (on pain of irrationality) rule out classically inconsistent worlds.
And, therefore, the dominance-relevant worlds are just the classically consistent ones:
“no matter what” an agent has learned, rationality requires that their degrees of be-
lief obey the axioms of probability. More generally, we can introduce a weakened
form of (DA), as follows:
(DA†) Dominance avoidance†
An agent is rational only if they are not accuracy dominated relative
to the rationally permissible worlds.
In combination with (IE), this new weaker version of the dominance avoidance prin-
ciple yields (DA∗), exactly as desired. The standard accuracy-dominance machin-
ery then induces coherence requirements determined in the normal way: whatever
is in the convex hull of the rationally permissible worlds is a rationally permissi-
ble credence function; whatever is outside it is not. Since (IE) guarantees that the
dominance-relevant worlds are just the classically consistent worlds, the result is an
argument in support of probabilism: (IE), (DA†), and (CD∗) jointly entail (PR).
As was true in the last section, I suspect that there are a variety of similar moves
that one could make to patch the accuracy-dominance argument. My contention,
however, is that if we’re to avoid the conclusion that rationality requires full belief
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in all metaphysical necessities, something like the fix just given will be required.
More precisely: the only way to avoid the unwanted result is to appeal to non-alethic
considerations in fixing what count as dominance-relevant worlds and (plausibly)
the only normative considerations that fit the bill are justificatory or evidential in
the sense of relating to how the evidence constrains belief. At bottom, my reasoning
here is simply that the distinction that we need to make—between a priori logical
necessities and a posteriori metaphysical ones—is an evidential distinction rather
than an alethic one: both kinds of necessity are true at all possible worlds, but only
one is knowable without empirical evidence. Since it’s the latter property that we
want to isolate, there’s no way to get around the appeal to non-alethic considerations.
Allow me to come at the issue from a slightly different direction. As I showed in §2,
probabilistic credence functions dominate non-probabilistic functions because we’re
only evaluating them against classically consistent worlds. This restriction could in
principle be justified in a purely alethic manner—but, as we saw in the last section,
any alethic justification for the restriction to classically consistent worlds seems to
equally motivate a further restriction to the metaphysically possible worlds that is
undesirable. So if a justification for the restriction based in purely alethic consid-
erations is unavailable, what are the alternatives? Because the goal is to determine
what is rational for any agent, we need something that is both (a) not alethic and
(b) applies to any epistemic agent regardless of the world or context in which they
find themselves. What satisfies these two disiderata are conditions that apply to all
epistemic agents in virtue of being conditions on epistemic categories like belief, justi-
fication, knowledge, evidence, etc. That is: if P is a precondition of belief, then when
asking the question of what it is rational to believe, we can restrict our attention
to only those worlds in which P is true. The route I’ve sketched above appeals to a
particular claim about the nature of evidence: to have any evidence E at all—and
this includes the case where E is the empty set—is to be in a position where it is
irrational to assign any credence to propositions that are (classically) inconsistent
with E. This isn’t the only possible way to go, of course, but something in this vicin-
ity is necessary: we need some doxastic or evidential principle rather than an alethic
one. And if the argument for probabilism is to succeed, the relevant principle must
provide us with reason to restrict the dominance-relevant worlds to those that are
classically consistent (without also giving us reason to restrict them in a way that
eliminates all metaphysical impossibilities from consideration).
My own view is that this is project is hopeless, because it is rationally permissible
to assign non-zero probability to at least some classical contradictions. So there is
no true principle like (IE) that will justify the relevant restriction. Unfortunately,
arguing for that conclusion would take us too far afield. Instead, I want to focus the
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rest of this essay on the costs of amending the accuracy-dominance argument in a
manner like the one just sketched.
5 The consequences of non-alethic considerations
In this final section, I sketch two serious consequences of adopting the amended ver-
sion of the accuracy-dominance argument or something like it. The first of these is
largely dialectical. Moving away from purely alethic considerations seriously changes
the landscape of the argument between the probabilist who endorses the view that
logical omniscience is a requirement of rationality and those epistemologists who
reject this conclusion. I think this shift is already in progress: as we’ll see, a num-
ber of recent papers have outlined alternatives to traditional probabilist views that
drop logical omniscience; my claim is simply that whether these views are preferable
is something that cannot be decided by appeal to the machinery of the accuracy-
dominance argument. The second consequence is that we need to reinterpret what
the accuracy-dominance argument tells us; in particular, we need a different story
about what “accuracy” means in the current context and why it is something that
we should value.
Beginning with the dialectical consequence. The defender of probabilism has al-
ways been committed to the principle that rationality requires logical omniscience,
as this principle is a consequence of probabilism. While many see this as a high cost
to pay, the probabilist in possession of a purely alethic argument for probabilism
can (rightly) point out that it is supported by otherwise plausible premises about
rationality and the nature of the possibility space. As we’ve seen, however, that argu-
ment doesn’t work. Rather than allowing for the derivation of the rational necessity
of logical omniscience from plausible premises, the accuracy-dominance argument
requires that we assume that rationality requires logical omniscience—otherwise, we
can’t restrict the dominance-relevant worlds in a way that generates the right result.
As such, if we can’t give independent motivation for (IE) or something like it, the
accuracy-dominance argument gives us no reason to endorse probabilism. In other
words: absent an account of what evidence requires of agents, we can’t say what view
about rationality the accuracy-dominance machinery supports.
This result shouldn’t be surprising. A number of recent papers—namely Do-
gramaci (2018), Pettigrew (2021), and Williams (2018), the former two of which are
explicitly building on both the latter and Hacking (1967)—have argued against prob-
abilism as traditionally understood on the grounds that the account of rationality
found in the standard version of the accuracy-dominance argument is inappropri-
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ately “externalist and evaluative” (Williams 2018).9 Each of these papers presents
an alternative to probabilism that aims to better respect the intuitively internalist
character of rationality.
The three authors go about achieving this end in slightly different ways. Williams
(2018) argues for replacing the logically possible worlds found in the accuracy-
dominance argument with those that are “doxastically possible”—the worlds as-
sociated with epistemic modals—and an associated move to “doxastic probabilism”:
an agent is rational only if their degrees of belief are “a convex combination of the
functions that pick out the truth values of propositions at each [doxastically possi-
ble] world” (Williams 2018, 134). No further constraints on admissibility are required
or imposed. Pettigrew offers a conceptually distinct but similar solution: employing
Hacking’s notion of “personal probability”—“a world is personally possible for a par-
ticular individual at a particular time if by this time this individual hasn’t ruled it
out” (Pettigrew 2021)—rather than that of doxastic possibility, he defends “personal
probabilism,” which has much the same flavor in the sense that the constraints on
credence functions are structural and (at least in principle) an agent could rationally
doubt any sort of logical principle. Finally, while Dogramaci’s position is also impor-
tantly distinct in a variety of technical ways, for present purposes we can think of it
as “in-a-position-to-know probablism”: an agent is rational only if their degrees of
belief are coherent according to the “logic” given by all of the propositions they are
in a position to know (Dogramaci 2018, 121–22).
Besides the fact that all three solutions give up on some aspects of standard
probabilism—most notably, the commitment to rationality requiring logical omniscience—
what’s important is that all three do so by falling back on other epistemic notions
to pick out the relevant class of worlds: Williams’ epistemic “might” and “must,”
Dogramaci’s “in-a-position-to-know,” and Pettigrew’s “ruling out.” These three dif-
ferent notions are all essentially evidential in the sense described in the last section:
they are different ways of cashing out what the evidence requires and permits of
an agent. That is: in all three cases, the grounds appealed to in picking out the
dominance-relevant worlds concern what it is that evidence requires of us, not what
it is that’s true. In all three cases, therefore, the proposed rethinking of rationality
involves moving away from the traditional accuracy-dominance argument by intro-
ducing evidential considerations to pick out which worlds are dominance-relevant.
The upshot of the arguments outlined in this paper is to undermine the di-
alectical position of the probabilist relative to these alternatives. I’ve argued that
9Notable as well in this respect is Carr (2017, 530), who argues that the restriction to purely
alethic grounds must be abandoned on the basis of a different set of cases to the ones considered
here.
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the probabilist has no other way to patch the accuracy-dominance argument other
than appealing to evidential considerations, but that means that these evidential
considerations—principles like (IE)—must be defended against alternative views
about the nature of evidence like those adopted by Dogramaci (2018), Pettigrew
(2021), and Williams (2018). If we’re to have a successful and persuasive accuracy-
dominance argument for probabilism, we need some independent ground for thinking
that rationality requires logical omniscience. Absent such ground, the argument gives
us no reason to prefer probabilism as traditionally conceived to the alternatives out-
lined in the last paragraph.
There is an additional, less obvious, cost to adopting the proposed patch. Intro-
ducing evidential considerations into the argument—or, really, any alteration to the
set of dominance-relevant worlds—requires re-thinking what the accuracy measure is
actually tracking. In the purely alethic context, it does seem plausible that we’re mea-
suring something like closeness to the truth. In any context in which we’re allowing
any sort of “impossible” world, whether metaphysical or logical, this interpretation is
no longer plausible: some of the credence functions that accuracy is measured against
are ones that aren’t actually candidates for truth; they’re mere epistemic possibili-
ties. So our accuracy measure is now tracking something other than truth and truth
alone—it’s accuracy to the possibilities that haven’t been “ruled out” yet. As Carr
(2017) stresses, alterations to the notion of accuracy employed in the argument raise
a new and difficult question: why is this new notion of accuracy relevant to rational-
ity? How we answer this question will depend on precisely what we think evidence
requires of the agent; Williams and Pettigrew, for instance, can simply appeal to the
accuracy measure tracking how well the agent is doing by their own lights, a concept
with a clear connection to at least some accounts of rationality. This same option
is not open to the probabilist, however, who must offer a reinterpretation that is
neither purely alethic nor purely sensitive to the agent’s own evaluation of what’s
possible.
Regardless of how we end up choosing to interpret the relevant of accuracy, the
upshot is that veritist character of the accuracy-dominance argument is made promis-
sory at best. As discussed above, the original accuracy-dominance argument is associ-
ated with a commitment to using alethic considerations alone to pick out what counts
as rational. As Pettigrew has argued, this commitment fits nicely with veritism, the
view that accuracy to the truth “is the only fundamental epistemic virtue: all other
epistemic virtues derive their goodness from their ability to promote accuracy” (Pet-
tigrew 2016, 6). The modification suggested in the last section section breaks that
connection; any reason that we give for restricting the set of worlds to either the
by-their-own-lights possibilities or the to classically consistent worlds must be non-
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alethic. The result is that the veritist has more work to do. If they are to employ the
resulting argument, they must give an account of how the evidential considerations
appealed to here ultimately bottom out in alethic considerations. The literature on
this subject is far too vast to address here—most reliabilist accounts of justification
claim to achieve this goal—but incorporating a specific account of this sort is a cost,
especially since the original argument appeared to function without any premises or
assumptions about the relationship between truth and evidence / justification.
Breaking the connection between the veritism and the accuracy-dominance argu-
ment has consequences for those not committed to veritisim as well. More common
than an explicit commitment to truth as the sole epistemic value is a particular way
of reading the accuracy-dominance argument on which there may be other epistemic
values or virtues and the accuracy-dominance argument (and other arguments like
it) merely shows what accuracy to the truth requires of an agent. There may be
other requirements—which may interact with the demand for accuracy in various
ways—but the accuracy-dominance machinery captures at least one of piece of the
puzzle of rationality, namely what’s required by the aim of having true beliefs.
For the same reasons just given, however, this interpretation stands in need of
additional argumentation or support. If the arguments that I’ve offered are correct,
then the results of accuracy-based arguments rely on what are essentially implicit
assumptions about what evidence requires of agents—for probabilism to be what
alethic considerations alone require of an agent, we need some argument from alethic
considerations to (IE) or something like it. I suspect that there cannot be an argu-
ment of this sort, but I haven’t shown that here. Regardless, the present upshot is
that considerations of accuracy to truth alone are less constraining than the recent
literature sometimes makes them out to be: if I’m right and some assumptions about
the nature of evidence are necessary for any version of the accuracy-dominance ar-
gument, we have some reason to think that purely alethic considerations allow for a
broader range of positions than may previously have been recognized.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I’ve argued that the accuracy-dominance argument for probabilism
relies on an assumption that cannot be motivated on purely alethic grounds. In
particular, the argument requires restricting what Pettigrew calls the “dominance-
relevant worlds” to include only those that are classically consistent. Since there are
no alethic distinctions to be made between different kinds impossibilities, any alethic
justification for eliminating classical impossibilities from consideration would also
require eliminating metaphysical possibilities—with the implication that rationality
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requires agents not just to be logically omniscient, but also to believe all metaphysi-
cally necessary propositions as well. To avoid this unacceptable result, the only option
is to fall back on evidential considerations, to build into the argument an account
of what evidence requires of agents. As we’ve seen, there are a number of different
views that are possible in this respect: evidence may require very little of agents, or
it may require very much. In the former case, we’re left with something weaker than
probabilism; in some versions of the latter, we can still get the result that obedience
to the axioms of probability is a requirement of rationality.
References
Carr, Jennifer Rose (2017). Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief. Philos-
ophy & Phenomenological Research 95.3: 511–34.
— (2021). A Modesty Proposal. Synthese 198.4: 3581–601.
Dogramaci, Sinan (2018). Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience. Philosophical
Issues 28: 107–28.
Hacking, Ian (1967). Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability. Philosophy of Sci-
ence 34.4: 311–25.
Horowitz, Sophie (2014). Epistemic Akrasia. Noûs 48.4: 718–44.
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